The Legal Environment and Corporate Valuation: Evidence from Cross-Border Takeovers
Why do managers from certain countries engage in value-increasing cross-border takeovers while managers from other countries pursue acquisitions that destroy their shareholders' wealth? Why do crossborder mergers and acquisitions create total wealth that is positive in some cases and negative in others?
What are the sources of the observed wealth creation or destruction? While these questions are crucial to our understanding of the market for cross-border corporate control, the extant empirical evidence is ambiguous at best, particularly with regard to acquirer and portfolio returns.
In this paper, we focus on the incentive mechanisms created by the legal environment and corporate governance structure in foreign countries to explain the sources of value creation in the cross-border acquisition of U.S. assets. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1997, henceforth LLSV) introduced the notion that differences in investor protection against expropriation by insiders affect the nature and effectiveness of capital markets around the globe. Subsequent studies have shown that the legal environment and corporate governance structure affects the size and development of a country's capital market (LLSV, 1997) , the severity of agency costs (LLSV, 2000) , the type of ownership structure (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer, 1999) , the properties of accounting earnings (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000) , and the level of economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998) . In addition, recent studies have begun to assess the valuation impact of the legal and corporate governance environment at the industry and firm-specific levels, in terms of total firm value (Lins, 2002; LLSV, 2002) , the investment strategy of firm management (Wurgler, 2000) , and sector value across industries (Bris and Cabolis, 2002) .
Our research provides an important contribution to the literature on corporate valuation by examining for the first time the impact of the legal environment on the returns to U.S. target shareholders, foreign acquirer shareholders, and the (value-weighted) portfolio of target and acquirer returns. We are motivated to do so for two reasons. First, Wurgler (2000) finds that if the legal protections accorded minority investors are inadequate, corporate insiders are free to invest in ways that do not maximize value. Since the outright acquisition of another company is often the most dramatic and material example of the manager's investment decision, the study of cross-border takeovers provides an apt opportunity to test for this acquirer firm agency cost. Indeed, LLSV (2002) intimate that value creation in the crossborder investment decision should be directly related to the degree of shareholder rights, creditor rights, and the legal environment of participating firms. We test this hypothesis directly in this paper, holding the legal environment and corporate governance structure of target firms largely constant by examining targets domiciled exclusively in the United States.
Second, the existing literature on cross-border takeovers has to date largely focused on product and factor market imperfections (Errunza and Senbet, 1981; Williamson, 1988) , asymmetries in capital markets (Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; Froot and Stein, 1991) , and/or deal-specific variables discussed in the single-country, traditional merger literature (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988) . However, the role of legal environment and corporate governance structure across borders has not been addressed, and it is an empirical issue whether the strength of legal enforcement and investor protections can explain the variation in shareholder returns in cross-border takeovers, compared to the factors examined in earlier research. In the case of foreign acquirer returns, existing studies that examine multiple bidder countries have generally been inconclusive regarding significant explanatory factors, and little evidence exists regarding portfolio returns at all. 1 We address this shortcoming in the literature with the present study by providing evidence that the legal environment and corporate governance structure of acquiring firms are significant sources of explanatory power in an examination of the returns to target, acquirer and portfolio shareholders in cross-border tender offers.
In particular, we examine the cumulative abnormal returns to publicly-traded U.S. target firms, publicly-traded non-U.S. acquiring firms, and the value-weighted portfolio of target and acquirer firms from a sample of 181 successful cross-border tender offers during the period 1982-1991. 2 We account for 1 Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) is an exception that examines both foreign acquirer and portfolio abnormal returns. However, their focus is on traditional merger motives and foreign direct investment theories, and does not address the role of the legal environment in explaining the returns to cross border takeovers.
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Our choice of sample period is driven in part by data availability, but primarily by a desire for comparability with prior research on the gains to cross-border takeovers. Our sample period is inclusive of the announcement dates and sample transactions of the bulk of extant research in this area, including Harris and Ravenscraft both firm-level and deal-related features of these takeovers, while also controlling for the legal environment and corporate governance structure of the sample firms following LLSV (1998). We further control for the investment opportunity set of target and acquirer firms-and by extension, the opportunity for entrenched management to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors-by including the Tobin's q ratio for both acquirers and targets in our analysis. 3 We use our data set in cross-sectional regression analysis to evaluate the inferential power of alternative theories to explain the differential sources of shareholder value in the cross-border investment decision.
Our basic findings can be summarized as follows. Consistent with the hypotheses in LLSV (2002) and elsewhere, we document that the LLSV indices for the rule of law and the degree of shareholder and creditor rights protections for foreign acquirer firms have significant explanatory power in the examination of acquirer and portfolio abnormal returns. Thus, corporate governance structure and the legal environment create an incentive mechanism for managers to behave in a particular manner when committing corporate resources to their investment portfolio. Specifically, we find that both acquirer and portfolio returns are positively and significantly related to the degree of shareholder rights protective mechanisms and the legal environment where the acquiring firm is domiciled. For acquirer returns, there is a negative and significant relation with the degree of creditor rights protection. We interpret our findings as supportive of the agency cost contracting hypothesis for corporate governance structure, consistent with the arguments in Wurgler (2000) and LLSV (2002) that the transfer of corporate governance structure and legal standards across borders has significant valuation consequences for the firm's capital investment decision. (1991) , Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1991, 1996) , Shaked, Michel and McClain (1991) , Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos (1992) , Marr, Mohta and Spivey (1993) , Kang (1993) , Pettway, Sicherman and Spiess (1993) , Boebel, Harris and Parrino (1993) , Swenson (1993) , Servaes and Zenner (1994) , Dewenter (1995a Dewenter ( , 1995b , and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) , among others. In addition, our sample period is contained within the 1982 to 1995 period used to construct the indices for legal enforcement, antidirector rights, and creditor rights in LLSV(1998), which we use in our empirical analysis. The paucity of historical data on cross-border acquisitions prior to 1995 in the SDC database necessitates the hand-collection of much of the data used in this study, which imposes certain constraints on the time period we are able to examine. Tobin's q in this context is commonly used as a measure of managerial ability (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Lang and Stulz, 1994) , the investment opportunity set of the firm (Servaes, 1991) , and as a proxy for the agency costs of free cash flow (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991) as first argued by Jensen (1986) .
Furthermore, we find that for acquiring firm abnormal returns, the significance of the LLSV indices are strengthened after controlling for the deal-specific and market imperfections-based arguments studied in prior research. Since earlier studies of cross-border takeovers have generally been unsuccessful in finding consistent sources of variation for acquirer and portfolio returns, this study extends the traditional cross-border merger literature in a promising new direction.
In addition, we find that deal-specific features such as the degree of bidding competition and the presence of toehold stakes-as well as the level of target firm intangible assets and the Tobin's q of both acquirer and target-all have explanatory power in the analysis of U.S. target firm returns. In this regard, our findings are consistent with U.S. target-centric studies in the literature including Jensen and Ruback (1983 ), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988 ), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989 , Servaes (1991) , Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Servaes and Zenner (1994) , Dewenter (1995b) , and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) . However, we do find the interesting result, after controlling for these target firm effects, that the rule of law and the level of creditor rights enforcement in the acquiring firm country are positively and significantly related to target returns. We offer two alternative interpretations of this finding. First, it may reflect poor creditor rights enforcement in the United States compared to the other countries in our sample. Since creditor rights tend to remain in the same domicile as the physical location of the acquired assets (LLSV, 2000) , U.S. targets capture higher merger premiums from their foreign acquirers (with stronger home-country creditor protection) as a result of the greater opportunity for wealth expropriation of target assets pledged to U.S. creditors. The value of this opportunity is greater, and thus foreign acquirers pay more, the greater the degree of creditor protection in the acquirer country (acquirer returns are significantly negatively related to the strength of their creditor rights). Alternatively, our finding is also consistent with the view that when managerial interests are aligned with debtholders via strong creditor rights protections, managers pay more for the geographic diversity offered by cross-border assets.
Finally, despite the fact that our sample is constructed strictly of U.S. target firms in an effort to hold constant the target legal environment, we also investigate in a preliminary manner the impact of legal protections and shareholder/creditor rights within the United States itself. To do so, we differentiate target firms based upon their incorporation in Delaware compared to other states, as well noting transactions for which federal regulation and approval is required. For firms incorporated in Delaware, there is considerable debate whether the case law favors entrenched management at the expense of shareholders, thus reducing firm value (Cary, 1974) , or whether shareholders are protected leading to increased firm value (Winter, 1977; Daines, 2001) . The potential costs and rewards to shareholders from intervening federal jurisprudence can be similarly argued (e.g., Jarrell and Bradley, 1980) . We find weak evidence that U.S. target firm shareholders gain when federal approval is required for cross-border acquisitions, and these gains are at the expense of foreign acquiring firms, results consistent with the domestic tender offer returns documented in Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) . In the case of Delaware incorporation, we provide strong evidence that Delaware targets impose significant acquisition costs on foreign acquirer firms, and the portfolio return for such transactions are also wealth-destroying.
If Delaware firms are more highly valued than firms incorporated elsewhere (Daines, 2001 ), the implication is that there are less structural inefficiencies in Delaware's legal environment for acquiring firms to capitalize. As a result, the available gains for firms acquiring Delaware incorporated targets are lower in a competitive marketplace. We conclude that differential stakeholder protections and the legal environment have valuation consequences that carry over to the intranational, as well as international context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly outlines the alternative motives for cross-border acquisitions that we test for in this paper. Section II describes our data and our sample selection procedure, along with some descriptive statistics regarding the data set. Section III examines the abnormal returns and wealth changes for U.S. target firms, non-U.S. acquiring firms, and the portfolio of target and acquirer firms. Section IV presents our regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns in cross-border takeovers as a function of the acquirer's legal environment and corporate governance structure, both alone and after accounting for control variables. We conclude with a summary of our findings and suggestions for future research in Section V.
I. Sources of Wealth Gains in Cross-Border Takeovers
While the wealth effects of takeover acquisitions between same-country acquiring and target firms is an exhaustively studied area, particularly for U.S. domestic transactions, the empirical evidence regarding cross-border acquisitions is less developed. 4 What we do know is that the average abnormal return to U.S.
targets of foreign acquirers is positive and significant on average, and the aggregate wealth gains are greater than when the acquiring firm is from the U.S. (e.g., Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) . 5 For foreign acquirer returns, the evidence is more limited but generally suggests that acquirers earn no abnormal returns on average, or even suffer a winner's curse in some cases by earning negative returns. What motivates a firm to acquire assets outside its own country, and what are the valuation effects of the investment decision? We propose that the legal environment, corporate governance structure, and protection mechanisms for the stakeholders of potential acquiring firms have valuation consequences in terms of the types of investments firms undertake and the investment's ultimate value. We motivate our research hypotheses below, followed by a review of more traditional arguments that focus on product, factor and capital market imperfections in the ensuing subsection. LLSV (1997) introduced the notion that differences in external corporate governance mechanisms as they relate to investor protection against expropriation by insiders, along with the rigor of legal enforcement standards within countries, affects the nature and effectiveness of capital markets around the globe. Better protection leads to more valuable firms (LLSV, 2002) and more profitable investment programs initiated by firm management (Wurgler, 2000) . Moreover, the formal structure of protection mechanisms can mitigate the classic agency cost of the firm as put forth by Berle and Means (1932) and 4 Jensen and Ruback (1983 ), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988 ) and most recently, Bruner (2001 , provide excellent summaries of the research regarding domestic takeover transactions. We provide a listing of some prior research regarding cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets in footnote 2.
A. The Legal Environment and Stakeholder Protective Rights
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In the specific case of the chemicals and retail trade industries, Dewenter (1995b) finds that U.S. target returns are not statistically higher when the acquirer is foreign compared to takeovers with domestic acquirers within these two industry groups. 6 An exception in the case of single-country acquirers would appear to be Japanese acquisitions of U.S. assets; both Kang (1993) and Pettway, Sicherman and Spiess (1993) document positive abnormal returns to Japanese acquirers. Studies examining multiple acquirer countries generally document zero or negative aggregate acquirer returns with the lone exception of Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) , particularly when the cash flow rights of large ownership blocks are strong (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; LLSV, 2002; Lins, 2002) .
In this paper, we propose and test the hypothesis that the incentive mechanisms created by investor protection rights, along with the strength of legal enforcement rigor across countries, affects the value created and destroyed by managers in the cross-border acquisition of U.S. assets. In effect, we posit that relative differences in corporate governance rules between firms and nations, and the transfer of these rules between target and acquiring firm, is a source of value for merged firms in and of itself. Prior studies have found significant variation in the gains to acquiring and acquired firms as a function of the nationality of the bidder, but the ultimate source of this international variation in returns has not been satisfactorily addressed. We argue that the legal and corporate governance environment that the acquiring firm operates in, relative to the legal environment for U.S. target firms, provides a partial explanation for the observed variation in foreign acquirer and portfolio returns in cross-border acquisitions.
However, the direction and significance of the valuation effect of international corporate governance rules in the context of cross-border takeovers is not necessarily obvious. For example, in the classic agency cost framework, we expect managers in countries with strong shareholder rights to act in the interests of their shareholders and pursue more profitable acquisitions than do managers from countries with weak shareholder rights, ceteris paribus. In effect, the agency cost contracting hypothesis predicts that a formal corporate governance structure that protects shareholders reduces the classical contracting costs of disciplining poor management. Alternatively, managers in countries with weak shareholder rights may regard the acquisition of U.S. assets, where shareholder rights are strong, as an opportunity to opt in to a stronger corporate governance structure at a future date (LLSV, 2002)-via a cross-listing, spinoff or initial public offering of their newly-acquired U.S. assets-creating value for their own shareholders. Thus, the contractual convergence hypothesis (Gilson, 2000) shareholder wealth for the benefit of debtholders (Maquieria, Megginson and Nail, 1998) . Managers may also pursue risk-minimizing activities to reduce their employment risk at the expense of foregone desirable investments from the shareholders' perspective (Amihud and Lev, 1981) . Thus, the agency cost contracting hypothesis in this setting predicts a negative relation between the strength of creditor protections and shareholder gains in cross-border takeovers.
Alternatively, McDaniel (1986) argues that shareholders gain from mergers when bondholder rights are protected, as shareholders need access to external credit markets to fund future expansion. The benefit to shareholders provided by the monitoring role of lenders is well-documented (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989) and should be more credible the stronger are creditor rights protections (Esty and Megginson, 2002) . Further, LLSV (2000) document that total firm value is increased when both shareholder and creditor rights are strong. This effect is not a result of the transfer of corporate governance rules between acquirer and target; as argued in LLSV (2000), the rights of creditors generally remain in the same legal jurisdiction as the physical assets acquired. Instead, the firm value maximization hypothesis predicts a positive relation between the degree of creditor protections and acquiring firm shareholder returns, due both to the alignment of interests of all security holders of the firm in a merger, and the monitoring role provided by well-protected lenders. Our study sheds light on whether bondholder interests and their degree of protection are complementary or detrimental to the incremental gains to shareholders in the cross-border investment decision.
In addition to shareholder and creditor rights protections, the strength of legal enforcement in the acquirer country should be an additional determinant in the valuation impact of the cross-border takeover decision. We follow LLSV (2002) and Lins (2002) in focusing not only on the rule of law alone, but its interaction with shareholder and creditor rights in the acquiring firm country. A strong rule of law coupled with shareholder rights should result in a strengthened relation for the shareholder rights effect viewed in isolation, and similarly for a strong rule of law interacted with creditor rights enforcement.
However, a nation's rule of law, as posited in LLSV (1998), reflects the rights enforcement for all stakeholders in the firm, and not just its security holders. This can encompass the rights and claims of employees, community standards and goodwill, governmental edicts, environmental compliance costs, and political concerns. As a result, a strong rule of law interacted with shareholder and creditor rights can mitigate the valuation effects of the corporate governance structure on security holders viewed in isolation, and we explicitly control for this possibility in our empirical tests by including these interaction terms.
After controlling for the legal environment and corporate governance protection mechanisms for foreign acquirer firms, we are also interested in the valuation impact of legal structure within the United
States itself. First, we examine the returns for acquisitions of targets incorporated in Delaware compared to targets incorporated in other states. 8 Cary (1974) argues that Delaware case law supports entrenched managers and imposes social costs on the disciplining mechanism of takeovers of inefficient firms.
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We focus on Delaware as more than 50% of all public U.S. firms are incorporated in that state, more than ten times as many as the second largest concentration of incorporated firms (New York). In addition, the established case law in Delaware is more developed, particularly with regards to takeovers, than in other states, and Delaware law and its consequences have attracted particular attention in the literature. Nonetheless, our empirical design should be regarded as preliminary with regards to heterogeneity in state of incorporation and its valuation impact in the takeover of U.S. target firms. For example, Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) find that the adoption of antitakeover statutes in Pennsylvania resulted in lower firm valuations. In the context of LLSV's (1998) arguments regarding the strength of the rule of law as a source of value, we note that our simple binary representation for Delaware incorporated targets compared to other states can proxy for aspects of heterogeneity in the legal environment within the United States itself, much as we control for stakeholder protections outside the interests of security holders for acquirer firm countries when examining the interaction between the rule of law, shareholder rights, and creditor rights indices. To provide one such instance, by the end of our sample period 27 states had enacted "non-stockholder" constituency plans that statutorily govern the duties of directors in the case of takeover to consider issues such as the economic impact on the community, the interests of current and retired employees, creditors and suppliers, and wholly-owned or partially-owned local subsidiaries (e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann., Sec. 607.111.9 However, Daines (2001) provides empirical evidence that Delaware incorporated firms are more valuable and more frequent takeover targets, independent of firm operating characteristics. He concludes that Delaware incorporation creates value by facilitating the sale of firms and reducing barriers to agency cost mitigation, either by the creation of customized contracts (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991) , efficient contracting, or the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests resulting from the case law.
Daines ' (2001) study provides an important testable hypothesis for our research. If the market is efficient with respect to the value of Delaware's political economy, then the gains to target firm shareholders should be independent of the state of incorporation. Said differently, the homogeneity of state of incorporation (Black, 1990 ) is a strawman, as we view the valuation consequences ex post. At the same time, if Delaware targets fully capture this value, the achievable gains to takeover that ensue from structural inefficiencies in the market for corporate governance within the United States are zero. In the extreme, if Delaware firms attract greater bidding competition and acquirers view Delaware firms as more valuable ex ante, acquirers can suffer a winner's curse and overpay for the assets of Delaware relative to non-Delaware firms, consistent with the corporate hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986) . In this regard, our paper adds to the results in Daines (2001) by testing for whether the value created by Delaware incorporation is fully captured by Delaware targets, and whether there are associated acquisition costs imposed on the acquiring firm. 9 Finally, we examine the role of federal regulatory scrutiny and intervention when foreign acquirers pursue U.S. firms via tender offer. Proponents of tender offer regulation argue that it encourages information production and increases competition for target assets. As a result, target premiums should be higher. Regulatory opponents counter that the increased regulatory burden creates disincentives to acquire firms outright, with associated social costs of foregone but desirable takeover activity; in effect, creating a tax on the potential acquiring firm. Consistent with the latter view, Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and 9 Daines (2001) examines raw stock price merger premia for a sample of takeovers in the SDC database and finds no significant difference for the premia earned by Delaware versus non-Delaware incorporated target firms. Our tests here, in the context of cross-border tender offers for U.S. firms, allow us to expand on this aspect of his findings in the context of abnormal returns, as well as examine the costs and benefits to shareholders acquiring Delaware targets and the value change associated with the newly-combined firm.
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) document that increased tender offer regulation results in higher returns to target shareholders and lower returns to acquiring firm shareholders in domestic U.S. tender offers; Eckbo and Weir (1985) find that federal antitrust regulation imposes social costs on efficient merger combinations without effectively identifying cases of true market power concentration and anticompetitive behavior.
In the case of cross-border acquisitions of U.S. assets, the role of federal regulatory intervention is potentially more pronounced than in the case of domestic tender offer transactions. During the Reagan and Bush eras, the Exon-Florio Act and the oversight purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) served to increase the costs imposed on foreign acquirers of U.S. firms by subjecting proposed acquisitions to discretionary federal interagency review and potential presidential interdiction to block acquisitions (50 U.S.C. app. §2170; 31 C.F.R. §800.101-.702). The stated rationale for this new regulatory burden was to protect U.S. assets from foreign control, particularly in the areas of national security, raw materials infrastructure, and high technology expropriation. If these concerns run counter to the interests of shareholders, there can be valuation consequences to federal intervention for both U.S. targets and their foreign firm acquirers. For example, the process of regulatory approval can delay resolution of the takeover attempt, or discourage firms from pursuing efficient acquisitions, resulting in deadweight losses and social costs for the transaction in support of the public good.
Entrenched target management can conceivably use such regulatory interdiction as an implied or overt antitakeover defense mechanism, thwarting desirable combinations to the detriment of shareholders.
Alternatively, if foreign acquirers wish to mitigate such actions and regulatory burden, along with preempting competitor bidders not subject to federal review, they can offer premiums for those transactions to resolve bidding uncertainty and achieve successful bidding outcomes. To address these possibilities, we examine the role of federal regulatory review for cross-border tender offers in our empirical tests below. Our exploration of the role of federal intervention for cross-border tender offers during our sample period is preliminary in nature. In our empirical design, we merely indicate via a binary classification method whether the bids from potential foreign acquirers were subject to federal agency review, or not. We make no attempt to
B. Asymmetries and Imperfections in International Asset Markets
The work of Kindleberger (1969 ), Caves (1971 ), Hymer (1976 , Errunza and Senbet (1981) and Dunning (1988) gave rise to the industrial organization-based theories of foreign direct investment that attribute the cross-border expansion of firms to imperfections in the market for goods, services and factors of production (Krugman, 1987 , provides an overview). These theories suggest that overseas expansion allows firms to obtain monopolistic rents from specialized resources possessed by the firm. If the market for these specialized resources is inefficient, cross-border expansion allows the firm to internalize the market for the resource and transfer it overseas (Williamson, 1988) .
Two examples of specialized resources owned by firms that may exist in an inefficient global marketplace are technical assets and managerial ability. A likely candidate for internalization of technical assets is the firm's research and development (R&D) program, or alternatively, the firm's portfolio of intangible assets. Foreign acquirers can use overseas expansion to extract monopolistic rents from these specialized resources via foreign direct investment or, in the extreme case, the outright acquisition of firms. Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos (1992) and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) provide evidence that R&D intensity is related to the observed gains from cross-border takeovers, and Swenson (1993) finds a similar relation in the case of intangible assets; however, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) find no significant relation. Similarly, firms with superior managerial talent may be able to monetize their abilities by expanding overseas in related industries, and thus be willing to pay higher premiums for U.S. targets in the same sector.
11 Marr, Mohta and Spivey (1993) provide supporting evidence that target returns are positively related to acquirer industrial relatedness; Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and others find no relatedness effect.
control for the outcomes of the review process, the specific reviewing agency involved (e.g., the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and others), or distinguish between transactions subject to cursory, as opposed to Exon-Florio, review. Since our sample is comprised entirely of successful tender offer acquisitions, the discriminatory power of the impact of federal regulation on cross-border takeovers would be enhanced in a study that also examines unsuccessful foreign acquirer bids, and those subject to overt CFIUS opposition under the Exon-Florio law. We defer this topic to further research.
An alternate explanation for the mixed results regarding the monetization of managerial talent, not addressed in earlier cross-border takeover studies, relies on the use of Tobin's q rather than business relatedness to capture this effect. In domestic takeover studies, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989, 1991) and Servaes (1991) document a significant relation between target and acquirer q and the gains to merger, with takeovers of low q targets by high q bidders providing the maximum gains. To the extent that Tobin's q provides a measure of the firm's investment opportunity set, and thus the incentives to make profitable acquisitions, Tobin's q will capture aspects of the valuation of managerial talent obscured by relatedness effects. Viewed differently, Tobin's q acts as a proxy for the free cash flow agency costs of the firm, and thus the risk that poor management expropriates shareholder cash flow and wealth is increased (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991) . In the case of cross-border acquisitions however, the role of firm-specific q levels for acquirers has not been addressed in prior research.
In addition to product and factor market imperfections, informational asymmetries and structural barriers to integrated capital markets can create differential valuation of assets across borders. Froot and Stein (1991) provide a model where the existence of informational asymmetries prevents entrepreneurs from purchasing assets solely with external funds. Therefore, internal funds, or the net wealth of the acquirer, are needed to complete the acquisition. Since the net wealth of the foreign acquirer relative to a domestic asset acquirer varies with the real exchange rate, foreign bidders are at an advantage when the real value of their currency rises versus the dollar. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos (1992) , Kang (1993) , Swenson (1993) and Dewenter (1995a) provide weak evidence that U.S. target abnormal returns and foreign acquirer returns are related to the real value of the foreign acquirer's currency, while Servaes and Zenner (1994) , Dewenter (1995b) and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) find that the exchange rate is uninformative.
An alternate structural asymmetry in global capital markets is proposed in Scholes and Wolfson (1990) , who note that differential taxation across borders should have a discernable effect on the level and profitability of investment activity in the U.S., and by extension, the value of U.S. targets to domestic and foreign acquirers. Specifically, Scholes and Wolfson argue that the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), with its investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules, substantially increased the tax incentives for acquisitions of U.S. assets by domestic purchasers, with a consequent implicit tax imposed on foreign acquirers as a result. Conversely, the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA), featuring reduced marginal corporate tax rates in the U.S. and deferred tax payments until their ultimate repatriation, increased the value of U.S. assets to foreign investors domiciled in higher tax jurisdictions. Servaes and Zenner (1994) document strong support for the relative taxation argument in the form of a regime shift in the gains to target and acquirer firms in cross-border takeovers of U.S. assets, while Boebel, Harris and Parrino (1993) also find a tax effect when restricting their attention to U.K. and Canadian acquirers compared to domestic U.S. buyers. However, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Dewenter (1995b) , and others do not find support for tax regime effects in the returns to cross-border takeover transactions.
What conclusions can be drawn from the existing empirical literature on the wealth effects of crossborder takeovers? It would appear that the sources of wealth changes to U.S. targets are inconclusive, and the evidence regarding foreign acquirer and portfolio returns is not well-developed. This is due, at least in part, to a past focus on single-country acquirers and/or insufficient data to examine the firm-specific characteristics of foreign acquiring firms. We approach the problem by exploring a new avenue for the potential sources of variation in returns to participating shareholders in cross-border takeover contests; namely, the corporate governance structure and legal environment under which firms operate. At the same time, we control for firm and deal-specific factors, and construct a data set comprised of multiple acquirer countries.
II. Data Description
A. Sample Selection
The "Foreign Investment in the United States" section of the M&A transactions roster in Mergers and Acquisitions was initially reviewed for the time period January 1982 through December 1991 to identify successful tender offers for U.S. targets by foreign acquirers. Announcement and effective dates for the offers were verified using The Wall Street Journal, The Wall Street Journal Index, LEXIS/NEXIS, and the actual SEC filings for the bids (when available). We collect the first announcement date of a formal bid for the target firm and not the first rumored bid that appears in the press. Hence, we expect that in general, there will be some information leakage effects for the firms in our sample relative to the initial announcement date (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988 Once an acquisition met these initial screening criteria, it was then checked to see if the transaction was successful, which we define as the foreign bidder gaining 50 percent or greater control of the voting shares of the target firm for the first time. Thus toehold acquisitions, cleanup transactions, and unsuccessful offers are not part of our sample. 12 We focus on these specific offers because we want a relatively homogeneous sample with which we can investigate the effects of actual changes in corporate control, especially as it relates to the impact of corporate governance structure and the role of the legal environment. 13 We also discard offers involving financial services firms, regulated utilities, and takeovers involving foreign acquirers that are government-owned enterprises. Finally, for U.S. targets we require share price data on the CRSP returns tape and financial statement information on COMPUSTAT; for foreign firms, we require daily stock prices and returns from Datastream International and financial statement information from COMPUSTAT Global Vantage. We further require no missing stock returns for the U.S. target or foreign acquirer during the announcement event period. After employing these criteria, our final sample for analysis consists of a matched set of 181 successful tender offers for U.S.
target firms by 150 publicly-held foreign acquirer firms over the period 1982 through 1991.
B. Data Characteristics
Our final sample consists of 181 successful tender offers for publicly-held U.S. firms by publiclyheld foreign acquirers. A distribution of the cross-border tender offers by home country of acquirer, target industry group, and year of first announcement of the takeover is presented in Table I . 14 The largest group of acquirers comes from the United Kingdom accounting for 76 of the 181 takeovers in our sample.
12
Hence, some of the firms in our sample remain listed in the U.S. after the offer is completed, since we do not screen off of the delisting date. This reflects our contention that the attainment of majority share ownership of a U.S. firm, and not the actual delisting of the target, denotes the relevant change in corporate control for valuation purposes. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of our transactions involve complete delisting of the target-the median length of time for all firms in our final sample between the announcement date of the last bid and the delisting date is 31 days.
13 Huang and Walkling (1987) and Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) find no significant distinction between tender offer and merger transactions after controlling for method of payment and target management resistance. We focus on tender offer transactions primarily due to the greater reporting requirements imposed on acquirers and targets during the transaction process (SEC 14-d1 and 14-d9).
Japanese firms constitute the second largest acquirer group with takeovers of 19 U.S. firms during our sample period, closely followed in sample size by French, Canadian and Swiss firms who acquired 16, 13
and 12 U.S. targets, respectively. 15 Altogether, our sample has representation from each of the four legal families discussed in LLSV(1998), of both common-law and civil-law origin. In terms of U.S. target industry groups, there is a broad distribution of takeovers across industries and acquirer countries with no strong pattern or preference for one industry group and acquirer country compared to any other, with the exception of the lack of takeovers in the chemicals industry by U.K. acquirers during our sample period.
Insert Table I About Here
The variation in the number of takeovers of U.S. targets by year in the 1982-1991 period, shown in Panel B, is similar to the evidence documented in Scholes and Wolfson (1990) . The number of takeovers after 1986 exceeds the number prior to 1987, consistent with their tax-based argument for the flow of cross-border capital as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. However, the variation over time in crossborder takeover frequency is also consistent with the exchange rate argument of Froot and Stein (1991) and documented in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) . It may be difficult to differentiate between these competing hypotheses for the flow of cross-border investment capital in this time period, given the contemporaneous correlation between the change in tax regime and the structural shift in the value of the dollar in 1986.
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Compared to previous studies, the number of transactions we report in Table I for our final sample are slightly less than, for example, Kang (1993), Dewenter (1995b) , and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) . However, we note that our screening criteria rejects toehold acquisitions, cleanup offers, negotiated mergers and asset divestitures since we focus here on corporate control change events, where prior studies are more focused on foreign direct investment capital flows in general. Perhaps more directly, our data requirements are more stringent in this paper as we demand that both acquirer and target be publicly-traded with available returns data, and both acquirer and target have available accounting data in the year of the first announcement date (at a minimum). In the same vein, we note that while our sample has representation from 16 separate acquirer countries across all four of the legal families in LLSV (1998), only two observations involve acquirers from emerging market nations. While this is primarily due to the rarity of acquisitions made by firms from lessdeveloped capital markets, our data requirements also play a role. As a result, we expect the discriminatory power of acquirer firm legal environment and stakeholder protections in our tests below, as envisioned by LLSV, to be somewhat weaker than ideal, as the severity of agency costs and asymmetric information is likely greater in emerging market economies than in more developed capital markets (Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000) . Table II presents deal characteristics and firm-related variables of the foreign takeovers in our sample differentiated by home country of the acquirer. The data in Table II present Thus, our sample would not appear to be biased regarding Delaware-incorporated targets; e.g., Daines (2001) reports 50 percent of his target firms are Delaware corporations.
The remaining descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table II indicate that, by and large, our sample characteristics are broadly similar to data examined in prior studies. For example, foreign acquirers rarely engage in hostile takeovers of U.S. targets, with the average number of takeovers deemed hostile roughly 20 percent in our sample. 18 In addition, nearly all (90 percent) of the successful cross-border takeovers involve cash as the method of payment, and less than 12 percent of our foreign bidders had an initial stake in the U.S. target, for an average position of 2.75 percent of the target's outstanding stock prior to the first announcement date. The evidence that our data lacks a significant number of observations involving hostile offers, stock as a method of payment, or large toehold stakes suggests that our sample is relatively homogeneous with respect to these bid characteristics, and are similar to the sample characteristics examined in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Dewenter (1995b) , Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) , and others with respect to these variables.
Finally, Panel A shows that 67 (37 percent) of the transactions involve multiple bids, with half (34) of these being contests between more than one bidding firm (not shown), a frequency slightly higher than that in other studies. Similarly, we find that 57 percent of the foreign acquirers in our sample operate in an industry related to that of the U.S. target (which we define as cases where the acquirer and target operate in the same 2-digit SIC code 19 ), a frequency slightly higher than in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and elsewhere. The fact that a majority of the acquirers engage in related industry transactions is consistent with industrial organization-based theories that suggest firms engage in overseas expansion in related businesses in order to exploit specialized resources possessed by the firm (Williamson, 1988) .
Panel B of Table II presents descriptive statistics on firm-related variables. On average, the acquirer is roughly 10 times as large as the U.S. target in terms of total assets and sales, similar to the size 18 We categorize an offer as hostile if The Wall Street Journal states that target management was actively opposed to the bid, if we were able to clearly identify a white knight bidder that mentions the eventual winning foreign acquirer as a hostile suitor, and/or if SEC 14-d9 filings were available that stated management's intent to oppose the offer.
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For U.S. targets, we use the COMPUSTAT SIC listings in preference to those provided by CRSP due to the inferential power of COMPUSTAT SIC matching documented in Kahle and Walkling (1996) . Foreign acquirer SIC codes are compiled in IDD Mergers and Acquisitions and are meant to conform as closely as possible with the standard U.S. SIC system. Where this information was not available, we used the industry classifications reported in the Extel and Worldscope databases and matched these descriptions as closely as possible with those in the COMPUSTAT SIC listings.
disparities noted in domestic takeover studies (e.g., Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983) . However, the relative difference in size between target and acquirer varies somewhat by acquirer country, with
Canadian firms pursuing the largest-sized U.S. targets, on average. The foreign acquirers in our sample also feature less leverage than their U.S. targets, as well as a greater ratio of intangible assets to total assets and lower Tobin's q ratios. 20 Despite these sample averages, there is considerable variability across transactions and acquirer country with respect to leverage, intangibles, and Tobin's q, suggesting that firms from different countries engage in dramatically different types of acquisitions.
Overall, the descriptive statistics in Table II suggest differences across acquirer country that should be valuable in explaining the differential wealth effects that accrue to U.S. targets as well as foreign acquirers. Given previous empirical evidence documenting a strong relation between target wealth gains, bid characteristics, firm-specific characteristics and operational relatedness, our descriptive statistics present a compelling case to control for these variables in our cross-sectional regression analysis.
III. Target, Acquirer and Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Cross-Border Takeovers
A. Methodology
To estimate abnormal returns, we employ standard event-study methodology. Market-model parameters are estimated for a period of 200 days that begins 260 days before and ends 61 days prior to the initial announcement date (AD) of the offer (this date can be different for target and acquirer firms when a competing bidder other than the ultimate foreign acquirer bids first). Daily abnormal returns for firm j are measured as the market model prediction error during the event period, and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are formed over various event window lengths. For inference testing on the significance of individual daily abnormal returns (ARs) and CARs, standardized ARs and standardized
CARs are constructed and evaluated using the test statistic in Mikkelson and Partch (1988) . For all firms, 20 Due to data constraints involving the foreign acquirers in our sample, we employ the "approximate q" calculation for both targets and acquirers as used in Daines (2001) and LLSV (2002) and advocated by Perfect and Wiles (1994) and Chung and Pruitt (1994) . For a large comparison sample across diverse industries, both Perfect and Wiles and Chung and Pruitt find the correlation of "approximate q" with the detailed Lindenberg and Ross (1981) q-algorithm to exceed 90 percent.
we measure the initial two-day announcement effect (AD-1 to AD 0) and several broader event windows beginning as soon as 20 days before the initial announcement date and ending five days after the last announced bid, which we regard as the effective date (ED) of transaction closure. 21 We focus on the longer event window (AD-20 to ED+5) given the evidence in Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) regarding significant information leakage in corporate takeover contests. 22 For U.S. targets, market model and abnormal returns are constructed using the equally-weighted CRSP index. For foreign acquirers, market model and abnormal returns are constructed using the country-specific, equal-weighted market indices provided by Datastream International. 23 As a result, we are not limited to the examination of acquirers with U.S.-based ADRs as in Servaes and Zenner (1994) , nor must we resort to the meanadjusted returns methodology employed in Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) . Portfolio ARs, CARs, and standardized CARs are constructed following Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). Table III reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for U.S. targets, foreign acquirers, and the portfolio of target and acquirer for the complete sample over various event windows. 24 Table III indicates that the average CAR during the two-day announcement window (AD-1 to AD 0) is a highly significant +23.1 percent for U.S. targets and a similarly significant -0.92 percent for foreign acquirers. These results are similar to the abnormal returns documented in Jensen and Ruback (1983) for domestic takeovers, who 21 For single bid offers, the announcement and effective dates are the same, so the window AD-20 to ED+5 is fixed in length at 26 days. However, for the 67 multibid contests in our sample, the event window will vary in length; for these transactions, the median time between the initial and final bid announcement dates (ED minus AD) is 22.0 days.
B. CAR Values and Wealth Gains for Targets, Acquirers and Portfolio over Different Event Windows
22
The longer event window beginning at AD-20 is also used in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Servaes and Zenner (1994) , Dewenter (1995b) , and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) among others, thus facilitating the comparison of our findings to prior cross-border takeover studies. We also note that as we focus on tender offers in our sample, we expect the disclosure requirements and tendering period delays of the SEC's procedures for tender offer bids, as enforced by the Williams Act (1968), to result in additional information production and returns response over a longer horizon window than is the case for merger or toehold acquisitions.
23
Datastream International provides data on market-wide indices for over a dozen foreign country stock exchanges analogous to the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted indices, as well as data on indices made up of a subset of the stocks on an exchange akin to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We use the broadest market-wide, equal-weighted index for a given home country exchange provided by Datastream International. 24 We do not report the individual daily ARs in Table III out of space considerations; however, these results are available from the authors upon request.
find that the lion's share of the gains to takeover are captured by target shareholders at the expense of the acquiring firm, which overpays on average. In fact, the CAR values for target and acquirer for all event windows in Table III (compared to -2.14 percent in Table III ). In addition, Table III suggests that information leakage to the market prior to the announcement date of a foreign takeover bid does occur, with positive and significant U.S. target CAR values of +3.6 percent over the event window AD-20 to AD-6, an effect also documented in Kang (1993) and Servaes and Zenner (1994) ; however, we do not find any preannouncement effect for the foreign acquiring firm.
Insert Table III About Here
In the case of portfolio CARs, Table III indicates that cross-border tender offers are wealthincreasing transactions, on average, over all event windows. The two-day announcement return is a positive and highly significant 2.99 percent, this portfolio return increasing to 5.03 percent over the longer AD-20 to ED+5 event period. Further, these portfolio gains are fully captured by the U.S. targets, consistent with a competitive cross-border market for the acquisition of U.S.-based firms. The sources of these portfolio wealth gains and their distribution across various transaction characteristics, however, remains for further analysis. Existing domestic takeover studies suggest the possibility of synergy gains, economies of scale, market power and firm revaluation, while the foreign direct investment literature suggests the possibility of exploiting product, factor and capital market imperfections. We explore this topic along with the role of the legal environment and stakeholder protection mechanisms in Section IV.
25
We do not report out of space considerations a breakdown of the CAR values in Table III by target firm industry, but simply note here that with the exception of lower target returns in the trade industry group, there is no significant variation in target, acquirer, or portfolio returns in our sample for any of the broad industry groupings in Table I . These results are available from the authors upon request.
Insert Table IV About Here
In addition, we report in Table IV the U.S. dollar value of the synergy gains to cross-border tender offers in our sample, as well as the abnormal wealth created for U.S. target and foreign acquirer firms separately. 26 Given the CAR values documented in Table III , it is not surprising that significant wealth is created, on average, in cross-border takeovers, with the average transaction resulting in $103 million of revalued wealth for the combined entity. Consistent with prior studies of the domestic takeover market (e.g., Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988), the wealth gains are entirely captured by the target firm shareholders on the order of $122 million per tender offer, with foreign acquirers losing an insignificant $31 million in the acquisition process. However, Table IV shows that there is significant variation in the wealth gains to cross-border takeovers depending on the home country of the acquiring firm. To a certain extent, this variation is a function of the size of the transaction; e.g., German acquirers are larger on average than their counterparts from other countries, and Canadian acquirers pursue larger targets. More generally though, the implication from Table IV is that significant variation exists depending on the domicile of the acquiring firm, and this variation may reflect the different legal environment and corporate governance protection mechanisms for the many acquiring firm countries in our sample. We address this issue next. The results in Table IV are not adjusted for base-year constant U.S. dollars; the raw dollar gains in the year and month of the transaction are reported. Since the distribution of wealth gains are highly non-normal, as an alternative to the t-test results in Table IV we also constructed simple Wilcoxon signed ranks test statistics for the wealth gains. Doing so gives results similar to those reported in the table, with the exception that the dollarwealth gains for German acquirers becomes significant at the 10 percent level, and for U.K. acquirers the wealth gains become significant at the 5 percent level.
IV. Cross-Sectional Regression Tests of Target, Acquirer and Portfolio CARs
A. Legal Environment and Corporate Governance Structure Effects
residuals to control for heteroskedastic effects. We report three separate regressions in Table V for target, acquirer and portfolio CARs over the long-window event period AD-20 to ED+5: (1) as a function of the strength of legal enforcement within the acquirer country; (2) the degree of shareholder and creditor rights protections in the acquirer country, alone and interacted with the strength of legal enforcement; and (3) the differential returns for tender offers involving Delaware-incorporated targets and tender offers subject to federal regulation, after controlling for the acquirer firm corporate governance environment.
Insert Table V About Here
Regression model (1) examines the univariate impact of the rule of law in the acquiring firm country on the abnormal returns in successful cross-border tender offer contests. Foreign acquirers earn significantly higher returns when the rule of law is strong in their country, and their associated U.S.
targets earn significantly lower acquisition premiums. From the acquirer's perspective, this result complements the findings in Wurgler (2000) that firms make better and more profitable investment decisions the greater are stakeholder protections. If managers are properly incentivized by legal precedent, structure, and constraints, they willingly bear search costs to identify profitable investments for the benefit of the firm's security holders, and pay lower acquisition premiums to their targets as a result.
In this sense, the legal environment that firms operate in serves as a substitute contracting mechanism for mitigating agency costs (LLSV, 1998).
However, legal enforcement and the strength of the rule of law in a nation reflects the protections accorded to all stakeholders of the firm, and not necessarily the rights and protections of security holders alone. As a result, regression model (2) in Table V examines the returns to U.S. targets, foreign acquirers, and the combined entity as a function of the specific rights protections for shareholders and creditors separately, along with the rule of law and interactions between these variables. Simultaneously, we can examine whether any of the agency cost contracting, contractual convergence, or firm maximization hypotheses offer significant explanatory power in the observed variation in returns. We document several interesting findings.
For acquirers, we find that returns are significantly greater the stronger are shareholder protections, and significantly lower the greater are creditor protections. These results are consistent with the agency cost contracting hypothesis and the interplay of the inherent shareholder/bondholder conflict within the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . When shareholders are protected, the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders is strong, and managers pursue wealth-creating investment policies for their shareholders as a result. Conversely, when creditors are protected, managers engage in cross-border takeover activity that reduces shareholder wealth. Our findings suggest that expropriation of one class of security holders at the expense of the other in the cross-border investment decision is possible, if there exists variation in the corporate governance structure of the firm with respect to its security holders.
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In addition, regression model (2) reports that the interaction between the rule of law and the protections accorded security holders mitigate the benefits of reduced agency costs from the acquiring firm shareholders' perspective. If a strong rule of law and legal enforcement doctrine protect the interests of non-security-owner stakeholders of the firm, the alignment of interests between management and shareholders, and management and creditors is weaker. Consistent with this argument, Table V documents that the interaction between the rule of law index and shareholder protection mechanisms is negative and significant for acquirers, and the interaction between rule of law and creditor protection mechanisms is positive and significant; in both cases, of opposite sign to the coefficients for shareholder and creditor rights alone. In fact, after including these interaction terms, the rule of law index itself is no longer significant in the acquirer firm regression of model (2), emphasizing the interplay between the 27
We note two important qualifications to our regression results in Table V that temper the strength of our findings. First, our focus on successful cross-border tender offers, at least during the sample period, necessarily means that we have little acquirer firm representation from emerging market nations; since agency costs are likely more severe for firms in developing economies (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998) , the discriminatory power of our results in this regard are weaker than desired. Second, recent work by LLSV (2002) and Lins (2002) documents that the role of legal environment, shareholder protections and creditor protections are strengthened to the degree that managers control the cash flow rights of the firm. Unfortunately, insider and block shareholdings data for the acquirer firms during our sample period is not reliably available. We leave this topic for later research and more contemporaneous transactions data.
legal protections accorded security holders and non-security owner stakeholders of the firm in explaining differential shareholder returns.
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In the case of U.S. target firms, we do not find any significant impact on shareholder returns as a function of the acquiring firm country's legal environment in regression model (2). However, the portfolio abnormal return for the combined entity exhibits a highly significant effect for the role of acquiring firm shareholder protections, of the same sign as documented for acquirer returns. Consistent with the agency cost contracting hypothesis, our results suggest that when shareholder rights are strong, acquiring firm management acts in the shareholders' interest by seeking out profitable investment opportunities (Wurgler, 2000) . In addition, the finding of a significant relation suggests that differences in corporate governance structure across borders is a source of value for merged firms, in and of itself (LLSV, 2000) . Our study confirms the results in LLSV (2002), Lins (2002) and Bris and Cabolis (2002) that firms operating under stronger legal environments are more valuable, but in this case applied to the specific instance of merged firms with differential cross-border corporate governance structures. We address whether this source of portfolio value is robust to more traditional sources of merged firm value, such as synergy effects and capital market imperfections, in a later section.
In regression model (3) of Table V , we examine the role of Delaware incorporated targets and federal regulation oversight of cross-border tender offers, after controlling for differences in the acquiring firm legal environment. With respect to the latter, the results from model (2) for targets, acquirers and portfolio are unchanged. In the presence of these acquirer firm corporate governance control variables, we find that target returns are higher when the transaction is subject to federal regulatory review, as in Jarrell
An additional point regarding our results for acquirer returns in Table V merits discussion. If there exists unobserved, country-specific heterogeneity in returns for the acquirer firms in our sample not captured by the LLSV indices, the potential for a spurious regression can exist. Earlier research in the area of cross-border acquisitions does in fact find variation in returns as a function of acquirer home country. In unreported regressions, we find that the acquirer returns in our sample also exhibit significant variation when employing a simple indicator variable approach for the acquirer countries reported in Table I , consistent with Dewenter (1995b), Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) and others. However, when we include these indicator variables in regression models (2) and (3) along with the LLSV indices, the country-specific dummies are not jointly significant at normal levels (joint F=0.98), whereas the significance for the LLSV variables as reported in Table V remain unchanged. We conclude that much of the acquirer home-country variation in returns documented in earlier research may simply be proxying for the variation in foreign country legal environment.
and Bradley (1980) and others, but without a finding of associated costs imposed on the acquiring firm.
This supports the traditionalist view that regulatory intervention furthers the public good by encouraging information production and soliciting more attractive bids for the benefit of target shareholders.
However, the most interesting result in regression model (3) concerns the significant negative impact of Delaware incorporation on foreign acquirer returns. Consistent with the argument in Daines (2001) regarding the efficiency of Delaware's political economy, we do not find that Delaware targets earn significantly higher abnormal returns than non-Delaware targets, though again we temper our conclusions by noting the conditional nature of our sample with respect to successful tender offers. Nonetheless, the evidence strongly suggests that foreign acquirers overpay for Delaware firms, and this finding is independent of the acquiring firm's corporate governance structure and, thus, the severity of agency costs within the bidding firm. 29 Perhaps more important, the significance of Delaware incorporation for the returns to foreign acquirers supports the notion that corporate governance structure within the United
States is a source of differential value to acquiring firms.
B. Control Effects: Firm-Specific and Deal-Related Variables
Next, we examine the robustness of our findings regarding the determinants of target, acquirer and portfolio returns in cross-border tender offers as a function of the foreign acquiring firm and U.S. target firm legal environments, as reported in Table V , after consideration of control variables. We address two sets of potential controls: deal-specific features of the transaction as explored in the traditional mergers literature (regression model 1), and foreign direct investment variables from the extant cross-border acquisitions literature (regression model 2). For target, acquirer and portfolio CAR values, we perform cross-sectional weighted least-squares regression tests over the same long-window event period AD-20 to ED+5 as before; Table VI reports the results.
29
In unreported regressions, we do not find the interaction term between Delaware incorporation and the strength of acquirer shareholder protections, creditor protections, and/or the rule of law to be statistically significant.
Insert Table VI About Here
In regression model (1) we examine several deal-specific variables that have been shown to affect the returns to targets and/or acquirers for tender offer acquisitions in general. By doing so, we establish whether our data and transaction selection criteria result in a sample that is grossly idiosyncratic or roughly conformable with typical transaction data sets in the mergers literature. Specifically, we control for the degree of bidding competition (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988) ; the size of the acquirer's toehold stake in the target (Choi, 1991) ; the method of payment (Franks, Harris and Mayer, 1988) ; the reaction of target firm management to the acquiring firm's offer (Huang and Walkling, 1987) ; and the relative size of target and acquirer firms (Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983) . Our findings generally conform to expectations. The greater the bidding competition for assets, the higher are target returns and the lower are acquirer returns; portfolio returns are positive but not significant. Targets earn significantly lower returns when the acquirer has obtained a prior equity stake, and significantly higher returns when the target is large compared to the acquirer. Only two findings from regression model (1) are a bit curious for our data set of cross-border tender offers. First, we find no significant effect for the method of payment in determining target, acquirer or portfolio returns; in fact, the sign is the opposite of expectations. However, we are hesitant to place much weight on this result given the paucity of cross-border transactions involving stock as a full or partial method of payment. More interesting is our finding that offers opposed by target firm management create value for the combined entity, with lower returns (albeit not at significant levels) for target shareholders. We return to this result later in the full regression model (3).
Model (2) in Table VI examines the abnormal returns for targets, acquirers and portfolio as a function of capital market imperfections and asymmetries. We include these variables as controls both to facilitate comparisons with earlier research in the cross-border acquisitions literature, and, later, to provide insight on the relative degree of explanatory power provided by the cross-border differences in legal environment and corporate governance structure for acquirer and target firms. The regressors in model (2) are the level of target firm intangible assets (Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos, 1992; Swenson, 1993; Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga, 1996) ; 30 business relatedness between acquirer and target firms (Marr, Mohta and Spivey, 1993) ; transactions subsequent to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Boebel, Harris and Parrino, 1993; Servaes and Zenner, 1994) ; and the level of the real exchange rate of the foreign acquirer's currency relative to the U.S. dollar (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Kang, 1993; Swenson, 1993; Dewenter, 1996a) . In addition, we include the Tobin's q ratio for target and acquirer firms akin to domestic tender offer studies such as Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989, 1991) and Servaes (1991) , under the premise that q proxies for managerial talent; Servaes and Zenner (1994) consider target q ratios in an examination of target returns for cross-border acquisitions.
Compared to prior studies, our findings from regression model (2) are mixed. We document strong evidence that the level of U.S. target firm intangibles leads to higher target returns, and smaller (though positive and significant) portfolio returns, supporting the premise as forwarded by Errunza and Senbet (1981) and Williamson (1988) of FDI as a mechanism to internalize the specialized resources of the firm.
Consistent with Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and (in a different context) Dewenter (1995b), we find no evidence of a business relatedness effect. We also find that target returns are significantly higher when low q targets are acquired by high q firms, as poor managers are disciplined by being replaced with superior managerial talent (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991) . In fact, the efficiency gains from managerial replacement are entirely captured by target firm shareholders (acquiring firm returns are insignificant with respect to q), even to the point of marginally less valuable combined firms when acquiring firm management is strong.
However, we do not find any tax or exchange rate effects in our results for either target, acquirer or portfolio returns in regression model (2). The existing evidence is mixed with respect to these 30 We follow Swenson (1993) and investigate target intangibles, rather than the research and development (R&D) expense examined in some other cross-border acquisition studies, primarily due to data constraints. COMPUSTAT does not reliably provide R&D expense line items for many firms on an historical basis, and moreover, there is a distinct industry bias with regards to the types of firms with reported R&D of any kind. To avoid this potential bias and increase the coverage of firms in our regression analysis, we instead focus on intangible assets, which are highly correlated with R&D and available for nearly all the firms in our sample. Nonetheless, in unreported regressions for the subset of firms with available R&D expense ratio data in the year of the transaction (N=58 for target regressions, N=39 for acquirer and portfolio regressions), none of the qualitative results in Table VI are changed compared to the reported results employing target intangibles. R&D is positive and significant for targets and portfolio returns, and insignificant for acquirer returns.
asymmetries, as some studies find the exchange rate informative while others do not; similarly, many studies find no tax regime shift effect while others do. On a univariate basis, for target returns, we find both effects to be present in our data; i.e., target returns are higher after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and target returns are higher when the acquirer's currency is relatively more valuable. The fact that neither of these variables is significant when examined simultaneously suggests that multicollinearity is partially at work, and may explain the mixed findings in earlier research. Indeed, we find the simple correlation between these two variables, for our sample, to be 57 percent. 31 Nonetheless, if we re-estimate regression model (2) with first the tax variable omitted, and alternately the exchange rate variable omitted, neither of the retained variables is ever significant in any regression in Table VI in the presence of other control variables. We conclude that while multicollinearity may partly explain the disparate results regarding tax and exchange rate effects in earlier research, at the least, the results presented here suggest that either of these effects alone provide at best marginal explanatory power in the determination of the returns to participating firms in the cross-border acquisition of U.S. assets via tender offer.
In regression model (3) in Table VI , we re-estimate the regression model (3) of Table V for robustness, after now controlling for the regression models (1) and (2) of Table VI . Focusing first on the acquiring firm shareholder returns, we document that our earlier results concerning the role of the legal environment are robust to the inclusion of control variables (none of which are significant), and the corporate governance variables are strengthened in terms of their statistical significance compared to Table V . Moreover, the federal regulatory review variable becomes significantly negative in the presence of controls, whereas before it was not different from zero. We draw two conclusions from these findings.
First, the primary source of relative value to acquiring firm shareholders in cross-border tender offers for U.S. assets is the legal environment in which the competing firms operate. To acquirers, the resolution of agency costs in the corporate investment decision, as enforced by the relevant governance structure,
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Our conclusions are unchanged under any of the alternate measures for real exchange rate deviations as explored in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and elsewhere. For any constructed measure of the value of the acquirer's currency, it is only significant for target returns, and only on a univariate basis. To control for potential aggregation bias in our sample that may obscure the tax effect, we also estimate a fixed-effects model regression with annual dummies following the time distribution in Table I . For either of regression models (2) or (3) in Table VI , the time dummies are not jointly significant at conventional levels.
supercedes the differential costs and benefits associated with the specific asset acquired and the characteristics of the purchase. In this sense, our study adds to the findings of Wurgler (2000) and LLSV (2000, 2002) ; not only are firms more valuable when the protections accorded security holders are strong and well-enforced, but security holders are directly rewarded as a result. Second, prior studies have provided mixed results at best regarding the returns to foreign acquirers in the cross-border takeover of U.S. firms. Our findings here suggest that one explanation lies in a consideration of the agency costs incurred by the firm, as captured by the legal environment and security holder protection indices first proposed in LLSV (1997 LLSV ( , 1998 .
For U.S. target firms, the results from regression model (3) suggest that abnormal returns are largely a function of deal-specific and firm-related effects. In this regard, our findings are supportive of prior studies that focus on the returns to U.S. target shareholders. Specifically, we find that the level of intangible assets, the q ratio for both target and acquirer, and the degree of bidding competition remain important determinants of the gains to shareholders, though the impact of toehold stakes and relative size are no longer informative. Interestingly, we do find that the strength of legal enforcement and the degree of creditor protections in the acquiring firm country become significant factors in explaining the gains to target shareholders in regression model (3). In Table V , these variables exhibited the same sign, but were not statistically significant at conventional levels.
We suggest two possible explanations for this finding once control variables are introduced. First, creditor rights protections in the United States (as measured by LLSV, 1998) are weaker than in most other developed nations, and weaker than all acquirer firm countries in our sample but for France.
Because creditor rights tend to remain in the same domicile as the physical location of the acquired assets (LLSV, 2000) , our results may be capturing the value to acquiring firm shareholders of the opportunity for wealth expropriation of target assets pledged to U.S. creditors. Consequently, acquirers bid higher premiums to capitalize this opportunity, which is reflected in the negative relation between creditor rights and acquiring firm shareholder returns. An alternate interpretation leading to the same conclusion follows from the agency cost contracting hypothesis. If managers are constrained to act in the creditors' interest when creditor protections are strong in the home country, managers can be willing to pay more for the geographic diversity offered by cross-border assets. 32 In either case, our finding emphasizes that the legal environment for both participating firms in a cross-border acquisition are relevant to the shareholders of both firms; the valuation impact of corporate governance cannot be viewed with respect to one participant in isolation.
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Finally, we examine the variation in portfolio returns for the combined entity as a function of the legal environment of the merged firms, transaction characteristics, and firm-specific qualities.
Interestingly, we find no evidence of traditional synergy value for merged firms in cross-border acquisitions. Business relatedness is insignificant, with the level of target intangibles and the degree of differential managerial efficiency no longer significant. In addition, we do not find that transaction characteristics are a source of value or costs for merged firms. Instead, transactional terms represent a zero sum game for target and acquirer shareholders, as argued in Jensen and Ruback (1983) and elsewhere. However, we do find that acquiring firm shareholder protections remain positive and significant for portfolio returns after consideration of control variables, consistent with the view that when managers are constrained to act in the interests of shareholders, agency costs are lower and managers pursue profitable acquisitions as a result. Thus, corporate governance structure and the legal environment 32 Notably, the asset diversity offered by unrelated or conglomerate cross-border takeovers, and presumably valued by the creditors of the acquiring firm due to the reduced cash flow risk, does not impact the gains to takeover nor the value of the combined firm, as we do not find business relatedness (or its Boolean opposite business diversity) to be significant in any regression in Table VI . Nor do we find (unreported) interaction terms between relatedness (diversity) and the LLSV indices to be significant. With respect to geographical diversity, it has been suggested that the existence of prior business operations or asset ownership in the United States by the foreign acquirer can capture this effect (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) . If so, the interaction between prior U.S. operations and the LLSV protection indices (in particular creditor rights) could be informative. Unfortunately, the ability to accurately discern the existence and materiality of prior U.S. operations for the foreign acquirers in our sample, during our sample period, is poor using the available data sources. Moreover, it is not clear to us what constitutes a material degree of prior presence from the perspective of acquiring firm creditors in the first place.
We also note the possibility that our finding of a significant effect for acquiring firm creditor rights protections and strength of legal enforcement may be spurious, in that it simply captures endogeneity between Tobin's q and the LLSV corporate governance indices. LLSV (2000), Lins (2002) and others find that firm value as measured by q is positively associated with security holder protections and the strength of legal enforcement within countries. However, if we omit Tobin's q from model (3) and re-estimate the results for target returns, the variables LAW, CREDITOR, and CREDITOR*LAW remain significant; conversely, if we estimate regression models (1) and (2) together, without the LLSV variables, target and acquirer q remain significant and of the same sign.
in which firms operate has value in the marketplace as first argued in LLSV (1997) , and this value is capitalized into the revaluation of the newly-combined firm.
The remaining significant factors in explaining the variation in portfolio returns are intriguing; namely, the positive and significant coefficient for opposed offers in conjunction with the negative and significant impact of Delaware target firm incorporation. If target firm management is entrenched, opposed offers can lower target shareholder wealth (e.g., Ryngaert, 1988) , whereas (successful) replacement of management by acquiring firms can unlock this value and result in more valuable merged firms. But we also document in Table VI between DELAWARE and OPPOSED for the portfolio returns regression in model (3), we find that the coefficient on DELAWARE becomes more negative and significant at the 1 percent level, the coefficient on OPPOSED becomes less positive and no longer significant at conventional levels, and the interaction term is positive and significant (p=.067). While merged firms involving Delaware targets are less valuable, reflecting the higher premiums paid by acquiring firm management, the merged firm is more valuable when Delaware management opposes the offer. Thus, our results suggest the arguments in Daines (2001) regarding the Delaware case law facilitating the sale of firms, in the specific situation of cross-border tender offers, has empirical support.
V. Conclusion
We examine the role of the legal environment for foreign acquiring firms, as well as differential corporate governance structure within the United States itself, in explaining the gains to acquirers, targets, and newly combined firms in the cross-border acquisition of U.S. companies via tender offer during the period 1982-1991. We provide evidence consistent with the hypotheses advanced in the international corporate governance literature, including Wurgler (2000) and LLSV (2000 LLSV ( , 2002 , that the degree of investor protections in global capital markets have material consequences in terms of the types of investments firms make and their ultimate value. We find that the existence of a strong rule of law and security owner protection mechanisms act as a substitute contracting mechanism for mitigating the classic agency costs of the firm. Acquiring firm shareholders gain when their rights are protected, and combined firms are more valuable; when creditor rights are strong, acquiring firm shareholders earn lower returns and their U.S.-based targets gain accordingly. We also find that differential legal structure within the United States itself, as captured by a firm's state of incorporation, has valuation consequences in crossborder tender offers. We document that foreign acquirers overpay for Delaware targets, and newly combined firms are less valuable as a result. When intervening federal regulatory scrutiny takes place, we provide weak evidence that this imposes additional costs on foreign acquirers.
Our findings suggest several avenues for future research. First, an examination of the returns to creditors in cross-border tender offers, particularly acquiring firm bondholders, would allow improved tests for comparing the agency cost contracting, functional convergence, and firm value maximization hypotheses as explanations for the sources of differential value created by the cross-border acquisition of U.S. assets. Second, the long-term performance of newly-combined firms, as a function of the legal environment and corporate governance structure under which it operates, would provide valuable insight into the sustainable value, if any, created by security holder and stakeholder protection mechanisms.
Third, recent work by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) , LLSV (2002) and Lins (2002) highlights the role for managerial control of the cash flow rights of the firm in the context of corporate governance structure and the legal environment. Should sufficient concentrated ownership data become available for foreign firms on an historical basis, a study accounting for ownership structure would add to the findings we present here. Finally, a more detailed look at the role of federal regulatory review and target state of incorporation, perhaps in a case study or outcomes-based framework, would further our understanding of the differential value created by heterogeneous corporate governance structure and legal environment Others ‡: Australia (8), Sweden (7), Italy (6), Netherlands (6), New Zealand (3), Belgium (2), Denmark (1), Luxembourg (1), Mexico (1), Taiwan (1) The table reports the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over various event windows for U.S. targets, foreign acquirers, and the portfolio of target and acquirer returns for 181 successful cross-border tender offers over the period 1982 through 1991. CAR values for targets and acquirers are calculated from daily market model deviations over the relevant event window with parameters estimated from the 200-day test period AD-260 to AD-61, where AD is the first announcement date of any bid for the U.S. target, and the announcement date of the acquirer's first bid for foreign acquirers. ED is the corresponding effective date of the final bid for the target; this date is the same as AD for single-bid takeovers. Portfolio CARs are calculated as the market value-weighted average of target and acquirer CARs as in Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) . The test statistic for significance is the Z-statistic calculated as in Mikkelson and Partch (1988) ; for portfolio CARs, the residual variance used in constructing the test statistic is the market value-weighted average of the residual variance from the target and acquirer market model regressions. Single, double, and triple asterisks throughout the The table reports the U.S. dollar-value of abnormal wealth gains for U.S. targets, foreign acquirers, and the portfolio of target and acquirer for 181 successful cross-border tender offers over the period 1982 through 1991. Wealth gains are calculated as the product of the respective target, acquirer, or portfolio CAR over the event window AD-20 to ED+5 with the market value of equity (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988) ; target equity is net of any initial acquirer stake. Foreign equity value is calculated as the market capitalization of the acquirer 20 days before its first bid, converted to its dollar-value equivalent using the (average) exchange rate during the month of the bid; exchange rates are from the Citibase monthly files. Single, double, and triple asterisks in the table denote significance for the simple t-test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedastic effects (White, 1980 The table reports the results of weighted least-squares regression tests of the role of the legal environment and corporate governance structure of acquiring firms in explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for U.S. targets, foreign acquirers, and the portfolio of target and acquirer returns for 181 successful cross-border tender offers over the period 1982 through 1991, after controlling for deal-specific characteristics of the takeover and capital market imperfections. The dependent variable CAR values for targets and acquirers are calculated from daily market model deviations over the event window AD-20 to ED+5, with market model parameters estimated from the 200-day test period AD-260 to AD-61. Portfolio CARs are calculated as the market value-weighted average of target and acquirer CARs as in Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) . The explanatory variables in the regressions to test the role of the legal environment and corporate governance structure of the acquirer are the indices for the rule of law (LAW), level of shareholder (anti-director) rights (SHARE) and creditor rights (CREDITOR) from La Porta et al. (1998) , along with dummy variables for U.S. targets incorporated in Delaware (DELAWARE) and takeovers that require U.S. regulatory approval (REGULATE). Control variables include deal-specific regressors MULTBIDS (dummy variable equal to one if more than one bid is made for the target), PREVSTAK (the percentage of target shares held by the ultimate acquiring firm prior to its first bid), STOCKPMT (dummy variable equal to one if acquiring firm stock is used in full or in part to finance the acquisition), OPPOSED (dummy variable equal to one if target firm management actively opposed the offer), and RELSIZE (ratio of target to acquirer total assets). To control for product and factor market imperfections, regressors included are USINTANG (proportion of target firm total assets booked as intangibles), USQHI (dummy variable equal to one if target firm Tobin's q ratio is greater than one), FXQHI (dummy variable equal to one if foreign acquiring firm Tobin's q ratio is greater than one), RELATED (dummy variable equal to one if both target and acquiring firm primary line of business are in the same 2-digit SIC classification), PRETAX (dummy variable equal to one for acquisitions with first bid dates prior to January 1, 1987), and EXRATE (exchange rate short-term to long-term percentage deviation in the month of the acquiring firm's first bid, constructed as in Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) . All regressions are weighted by the reciprocal of the square root of the market model residual variance for target and acquirer, and the market value-weighted average of these same residual variances for the portfolio CAR regressions, in each case to control for heteroskedastic effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
